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Abstract
We consider a general formulation of the Principal–Agent problem with a lump–sum payment on a
finite horizon, providing a systematic method for solving such problems. Our approach is the following: we
first find the contract that is optimal among those for which the agent’s value process allows a dynamic
programming representation, for which the agent’s optimal effort is straightforward to find. We then show
that the optimization over the restricted family of contracts represents no loss of generality. As a consequence,
we have reduced this non-zero sum stochastic differential game to a stochastic control problem which may
be addressed by the standard tools of control theory. Our proofs rely on the backward stochastic differential
equations approach to non-Markovian stochastic control, and more specifically, on the recent extensions to
the second order case.
Key words. Stochastic control of non-Markov systems, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, second
order Backward SDEs, Principal-Agent problem, Contract Theory.
1 Introduction
Optimal contracting between two parties – Principal (“she”) and Agent (“he”), when Agent’s effort cannot
be contracted upon, is a classical moral hazard problem in microeconomics. It has applications in many
areas of economics and finance, for example in corporate governance and portfolio management (see Bolton
and Dewatripont [3] for a book treatment, mostly in discrete-time models). In this paper we develop a
general approach to solving such problems in continuous-time Brownian motion models, in the case in which
Agent is paid only at the terminal time.
The first, seminal paper on Principal-Agent problems in continuous-time is Holmstro¨m and Milgrom [21].
They consider Principal and Agent with CARA utility functions, in a model in which Agent’s effort influences
the drift of the output process, but not the volatility, and show that the optimal contract is linear. Their
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work was extended by Scha¨ttler and Sung [33, 34], Sung [39, 40], Mu¨ller [25, 26], and Hellwig and Schmidt
[20]. The papers by Williams [42] and Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang [8] use the stochastic maximum principle
and forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) to characterize the optimal compensation
for more general utility functions.
The main contribution of our paper is the following: we provide a systematic method to solve any problem
of this sort, including those in which Agent can also control the volatility of the output process, and not
just the drift1. We first used that method to solve a Principal-Agent problem which had not been solved
before2 in a pre-cursor to this paper, Cvitanic´, Possama¨ı and Touzi [7], for the special case of CARA utility
functions, showing that the optimal contract depends not only on the output value (in a linear way, because
of CARA preferences), but also on the risk the output has been exposed to, via its quadratic variation. In
the examples section of the present paper, we also show how to solve other problems of this type by our
method, problems which had been previously solved by ad hoc methods, on a case-by-case basis. We expect
there will be many other applications involving Principal-Agent problems of this type, which have not been
previously solved, and which our method will be helpful in solving.3 The present paper includes all the
above cases as special cases (up to some technical considerations), considering a multi-dimensional model
with arbitrary utility functions and Agent’s effort affecting both the drift and the volatility of the output,
that is, both the return and the risk4. Let us also point out that there is no need for any Markovian type
assumptions for using our approach, a point which also generalizes earlier results.
In recent years a different continuous-time model has emerged and has been very successful in explaining
contracting relationship in various settings - the infinite horizon problem in which Principal may fire/retire
Agent and the payments are paid continuously, rather than as a lump-sum payment at the terminal time,
as introduced in another seminal paper, Sannikov [32]. We leave for a future paper the analysis of the
Sannikov’s model using our approach.
The main approach taken in the literature is to characterize Agent’s value process (also called contin-
uation/promised utility) and his optimal actions given an arbitrary contract payoff, and then to analyze
the maximization problem of the principal over all possible payoffs5. This approach may be hard to apply,
because it may be hard to solve Agent’s stochastic control problem given an arbitrary payoff, possibly non-
Markovian, and it may also be hard for Principal to maximize over all such contracts. Furthermore, Agent’s
optimal control may depend on the given contract in a highly nonlinear manner, rendering Principal’s opti-
mization problem even harder. For these reasons, in its most general form the problem was approached in
the literature also by means of the calculus of variations, thus adapting the tools of the stochastic version
of the Pontryagin maximum principle; see Cvitanic´ and Zhang [9].
Our approach is different, much more direct, and it works in great generality. Our primary inspiration
comes from the remarkable work of Sannikov [32] which exploits the infinitesimal decomposition structure
of Agent’s dynamic value function induced from the dynamic programming principle. Reminiscent of the
1This still leads to moral hazard in models with multiple risk sources, that is, driven by a multi-dimensional Brownian motion.
2Specifically, the problem of optimal contracting in delegated portfolio management, in a continuous-time model in which the
Principal observes the portfolio values over time, but nothing else.
3For example, our method is also used in Aı¨d, Possama¨ı and Touzi [1] for a problem of optimal electricity pricing, into which
the consumer is given incentives to moderate the volatility of his consumption.
4See also recent papers by Mastrolia and Possama¨ı [24], and Sung [41], which, though related to our formulation, work in
frameworks different from ours.
5For a recent different approach, see Evans, Miller and Yang [17]. For each possible Agent’s control process, they characterize
contracts that are incentive compatible for it. However, their setup is less general than ours, and it does not allow for volatility
control, for example.
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method of relaxing the control space in stochastic control theory, we restrict the family of admissible contracts
to a carefully chosen family of contracts for which Agent’s value process allows a certain kind of a dynamic
programming representation. For such contracts, we show that it is easy for Principal to identify what
the optimal policy for Agent is; it is the one that maximizes the corresponding Hamiltonian. Moreover,
the admissible family is such that Principal can apply standard methods of stochastic control. Finally, we
show that under relatively mild technical conditions, the supremum of Principal’s expected utility over the
restricted family is equal to the supremum over all feasible contracts. Mathematically speaking, the main
technical obstacle for considering moral hazard problems where Agent is allowed to control also the volatility
of the output is that, in a weak formulation setting, changing volatility cannot be achieved solely through
Girsanov’s type change of measure, and therefore creates non-dominated set of measures. We overcome this
hurdle and prove that our class of contracts is general enough by representing Agent’s value process in terms
of the so-called second order BSDEs, as introduced by Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36] (see also the earlier
work of Cheridito, Soner, Touzi and Victoir [6]), and using recent results of Possama¨ı, Tan and Zhou [30] to
bypass the regularity conditions in Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36].
One way to provide the intuition for our approach is the following. In a Markovian framework, Agent’s
value is, under technical conditions, determined via its first and second derivatives with respect to the state
variables. In a general non-Markovian framework, the role of these derivatives is taken over by the (first-
order) sensitivity of Agent’s value process to the output, and its (second-order) sensitivity to its quadratic
variation process. Thus, it is possible to transform Principal’s problem into the problem of choosing optimally
those sensitivities. If Agent controls only the drift, only the first order sensitivity is relevant, and if he also
controls the volatility, the second one becomes relevant, too. In the former case, this insight was used in a
crucial way in Sannikov [32]. The insight implies that the appropriate state variable for Principal’s problem
(in Markovian models) is Agent’s value. This has been known in discrete-time models already since Spear
and Srivastava [37]. We arrive to it from a different perspective, the one of considering contracts which are,
a priori defined via the first and second order sensitivities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we describe the model and the Principal-Agent problem in
Section 2. We introduce the restricted family of admissible contracts in Section 3.1. Section 6 presents some
examples. In Section 5 we show, under technical conditions, that the restriction is without loss of generality.
We conclude in Section 7.
Notation: Let N⋆ := N \ {0} be the set of positive integers, and let R⋆+ be the set of real positive numbers.
Throughout this paper, for every p-dimensional vector b with p ∈ N⋆, we denote by b1, . . . , bp its coordinates,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ p. For any n ∈ N⋆ with n ≤ p, and for any b ∈ Rp, we denote by b1:n ∈ Rn the vector
of the n first coordinates of b. For α, β ∈ Rp we denote by α · β the usual inner product, with associated
norm | · |. For any (ℓ, c) ∈ N⋆ × N⋆, Mℓ,c(R) denotes the space of ℓ × c matrices with real entries. The
elements of matrix M ∈ Mℓ,c are denoted (M i,j)1≤i≤ℓ, 1≤j≤c, and the transpose of M is denoted by M⊤.
We identify Mℓ,1 with Rℓ. When ℓ = c, we let Mℓ(R) :=Mℓ,ℓ(R). We also denote by Sℓ(R) (resp. S
+
ℓ (R))
the set of symmetric positive (resp. symmetric definite positive) matrices in Mℓ(R). The trace of a matrix
M ∈ Mℓ(R) will be denoted by Tr[M ], and for any (x, y) ∈ Mℓ,c ×Mc,ℓ, we use the notation x : y for
Tr[xy].
3
2 Principal-Agent problem
2.1 The canonical space of continuous paths
We now introduce our mathematical model. Let T > 0 be a given terminal time, and Ω := C0([0, T ],Rd)
the set of all continuous maps from [0, T ] to Rd, for a given integer d > 0. The canonical process on Ω,
representing the output Agent is in charge of, is denoted by X , i.e.
Xt(x) = x(t) = xt, for all x ∈ Ω, t ∈ [0, T ],
and the corresponding canonical filtration by F := {Ft, t ∈ [0, T ]}, where
Ft := σ(Xs, s ≤ t), t ∈ [0, T ].
We denote by P0 the Wiener measure on (Ω,FT ), and for any F−stopping time τ , by Pτ the regular
conditional probability distribution of P0 w.r.t. Fτ (see Stroock and Varadhan [38]), which is independent
of x ∈ Ω by independence and stationarity of the Brownian increments. Let Prob(Ω) denote the collection
of all probability measures on (Ω,FT ).
We say that a probability measure P ∈ Prob(Ω) is a semi-martingale measure if X is a semi-martingale
under P. By Karandikar [22], there is a F−progressively measurable process, denoted by 〈X〉 = (〈X〉t)0≤t≤T ,
which coincides with the quadratic variation of X , P−a.s. for all semi-martingale measures P. We may then
introduce the d× d non-negative symmetric matrix σ̂t such that
σ̂2t := lim sup
εց0
〈X〉t − 〈X〉t−ε
ε
, t ∈ [0, T ].
As σ̂2t takes values in S
+
d (R), we may define its square root σ̂t in the usual way.
Throughout this paper, we shall work with processes ψ : [0, T ] × Ω −→ E, taking values in some
Polish space E, which are F−optional, i.e. O(F)−measurable, where O(F) is the so-called optional σ−field
generated by F−adapted right-continuous processes. In particular such a process ψ is non-anticipative in
the sense that ψ(t, x) = ψ(t, x·∧t), for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ Ω.
Finally, for technical reasons, we work under the classical ZFC set-theoretic axioms, as well as the
continuum hypothesis6.
2.2 Controlled state equation
In a typical Principal-Agent problem, there are two decision makers. Agent has the possibility of controlling
what is generically referred to as the ”output” process (which in our case is X), by exerting effort through
controls of his choice. Principal delegates the management of the output to Agent, and sets the terms of the
contract so as to give him the incentive to perform the best effort for the management of the output.
A control process (Agent’s effort/action) ν = (α, β) is an F−optional process with values in A × B for
some subsets A and B of finite dimensional spaces. We denote the set of control processes as U . The output
process takes values in Rd, and is defined by means of the controlled coefficients:
λ : R+ × Ω×A −→ Rn, bounded, λ(·, a) F− optional for any a ∈ A,
σ : R+ × Ω×B −→Md,n(R), bounded, σ(·, b) F− optional for any b ∈ B,
6This is a standard axiom widely used in the classical stochastic analysis theory. See Dellacherie and Meyer [10, Page 5]. In
the present paper, these axioms are needed for the application of the aggregation result of Nutz [27]. See also Footnote 8 for more
details and insight about this assumption.
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where for given integers d, n, we denote by Md,n(R) the set of d× n matrices with real entries.
For all control process ν = (α, β), and some given initial data X0 ∈ Rd, the controlled state equation is
defined by the stochastic differential equation driven by an n−dimensional Brownian motion W ,
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X, βr)
[
λr(X,αr)dr + dWr
]
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.1)
Notice that the processes α and β are functions of the path of X . As it is standard in probability theory,
the dependence on the canonical process will be suppressed.
A control model is a weak solution of (2.1) defined as a pair M := (P, ν) ∈ Prob(Ω) × U , such that
P ◦X−10 = δ{X0}, and there is some n−dimensional P−Brownian motion W
M such that7
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X, βr)
[
λr(X,αr)dr + dW
M
r
]
, t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s. (2.2)
In particular, we have
σ̂2t = (σtσ
⊤
t )(X, βt), dt⊗ dP− a.e. on [0, T ]× Ω.
We denote M the collection of all such control models (as opposed to control processes), which we call
admissible. We assume throughout this paper the following implicit condition on σ, see (2.4) below,
M 6= ∅. (2.3)
This condition is satisfied for instance if x 7−→ σt(x, b) is continuous for some constant control b ∈ B, see
e.g. Karatzas and Shreve [23].
Notice that we do not restrict the controls to those for which weak uniqueness holds. Moreover, by
Girsanov theorem, two weak solutions of (2.1) associated with (α, β) and (α′, β) are equivalent. How-
ever, different diffusion coefficients induce mutually singular weak solutions of the corresponding stochastic
differential equations.
We next introduce the following sets:
P(ν) :=
{
P ∈ Prob(Ω), (P, ν) ∈ M
}
, P :=
⋃
ν∈U P(ν),
U(P) :=
{
ν ∈ U , (P, ν) ∈M
}
, U :=
⋃
P∈Prob(Ω) U(P).
As λ is bounded, it follows from the Girsanov theorem that any control model M = (P, α, β) ∈ M induces
a weak solution (P′, β) for the drift-less SDE
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X, β)dWt, t ∈ [0, T ], with
dP′
dP
∣∣∣∣
FT
= e−
∫
T
0
λr(X,αr)dr−
1
2
∫
T
0
|λr(X,αr)|
2dr. (2.4)
Conversely, for any weak solution (P′, β) of (2.4), with an F−optional process β valued in B, and any
bounded F−optional process α with values in A, we directly check from the last construction that (P, α, β)
is a weak solution of (2.1).
7Brownian motion WM is defined on a possibly enlarged space, if σ̂ is not invertible P−a.s. We refer to Possama¨ı, Tan and
Zhou [30] for the precise statements.
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2.3 Agent’s problem
We next introduce the cost function
c : R+ × Ω×A×B −→ R+, measurable, with c(·, u) F− optional for all u ∈ A×B,
and we assume throughout that
sup
(P,ν)∈M
E
P
[∫ T
0
ct(X, νt)
pdt
]
< ∞, for some p > 1. (2.5)
Let (P, ν) ∈ M be fixed. The canonical process X is called the output process, and the control ν is called
Agent’s effort or action. Agent is in charge of controlling the (distribution of the) output process by choosing
the effort process ν in the state equation (2.1), while subject to cost of effort at rate c(X, ν). Furthermore,
Agent has a fixed reservation utility R ∈ R, i.e., he will not accept to work for Principal unless the contract
is such that his expected utility is above R.
Agent is hired at time t = 0, and receives the compensation ξ from Principal at time T . Principal does
not observe Agent’s effort, only the output processX . Consequently, the compensation ξ, which takes values
in R, can only be contingent on X , that is ξ is FT−measurable.
A random variable ξ is called a contract, and we write ξ ∈ C0 if
sup
P∈P
E
P[|ξ|p] <∞, for some p > 1. (2.6)
We now introduce Agent’s objective function
JA(M, ξ) := EP
[
KνT ξ −
∫ T
0
Kνt ct(νs)ds
]
, for all M = (P, ν) ∈M, ξ ∈ C0, (2.7)
where
Kνt := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
kr(νr)dr
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
is a discount factor defined by means of the function
k : R+ × Ω×A×B −→ R, bounded, with k(·, u) F− optional for all u ∈ A×B.
Notice that JA(M, ξ) is well-defined for all (M, ξ) ∈ M× C0. This is a consequence of the boundedness of
k, together with conditions (2.5) and (2.6).
Agent’s goal is to choose optimally the effort, given the compensation contract ξ promised by Principal
V A(ξ) := sup
M∈M
JA(M, ξ), ξ ∈ C0. (2.8)
An control model M⋆ = (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ M is an optimal response to contract ξ if V A(ξ) = JA(M⋆, ξ). We denote
by M⋆(ξ) the collection of all such optimal control models.
Remark 2.1. Our approach can also accommodate risk-aversion for Agent’s utility function along the two
following modeling possibilities.
(i) Given an invertible utility function UA, substitute UA(ξ) to ξ in Agent’s criterion, or equivalently,
substitute U−1A (ξ) to ξ in Principal’s criterion below.
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(ii) Given a utility function UA with constant sign, consider Agent’s objective function of the form
E
P
[
exp
(
− sgn(UA)
∫ T
0
Kνt ct(νt)dt
)
KνTUA(ξ)
]
.
In particular, our framework includes exponential utilities, under appropriate modification of the assump-
tions, see e.g. Cvitanic´, Possama¨ı and Touzi [7].
In the literature, the dynamic version of the value process V A is introduced by an obvious shift of the
initial time, and is sometimes called continuation utility or promised utility. Such a dynamic version turns
out to play a crucial role as the state variable of Principal’s optimization problem; see Sannikov [32] for its
use in continuous-time models.
2.4 Principal’s problem
We now state Principal’s optimization problem. Principal takes benefit from the value of the output X over
time period [0, T ], and pays the compensation ξ at terminal time T , as promised to Agent.
We will restrict the contracts that can be offered by Principal to those that admit an optimal solution
to Agent’s problem, i.e., we allow only the contracts ξ ∈ C0 for which M⋆(ξ) 6= ∅. Recall also that Agent’s
participation is conditioned on having his value above reservation utility R. Thus, Principal is restricted to
choose a contract from the set
Ξ :=
{
ξ ∈ C0, M
⋆(ξ) 6= ∅, and V A(ξ) ≥ R
}
. (2.9)
As a final ingredient, we need to fix Agent’s optimal strategy in the case in which the set M⋆(ξ) contains
more than one optimal response. Following the standard convention, we assume that Agent, when indifferent
between such solutions, implements the one that is the best for Principal. In view of this, Principal’s problem
is
V P := sup
ξ∈Ξ
JP (ξ), where JP (ξ) := sup
(P⋆,ν⋆)∈M⋆(ξ)
E
P
⋆[
KPTU
(
ℓ− ξ
)]
,
and the function U : R −→ R is a given non-decreasing and concave utility function, ℓ : Ω −→ R is a
liquidation function with linear growth, and
KPt := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
kPr dr
)
, s ∈ [t, T ],
is a discount factor, defined by means of a discount rate function:
kP : R+ × Ω −→ R, bounded, F−optional.
Comments on the Principal-Agent problem
(i) Agent’s and Principal’s problems are non-standard stochastic control problems. First, ξ is allowed to be
of non-Markovian nature. Second, Principal’s optimization is over ξ, and is a priori not a control problem
that may be approached by dynamic programming. The objective of this paper is to develop an approach
that naturally reduces both problems to those that can be solved by dynamic programming.
(ii) Similar to the standard literature in stochastic control, the controlled coefficients λ and σ are assumed
to be bounded in order to highlight the general structure of the problem, without entering the potential
difficulties of singular stochastic control (specific definition of the controls set, lack of regularity, boundary
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layer, i.e. discontinuity of the value function due to control explosion). Such difficulties can however be
typically addressed on a case-by-case basis, see e.g. Fleming & Soner [18]. We emphasize that the general
methodology of the present paper extends naturally to the case of unbounded controls, see e.g. Aı¨d,
Possama¨ı and Touzi [1].
(iii) Notice that the controlled drift σλ is assumed to lie in the range of the diffusion matrix. When the
diffusion matrix is allowed to degenerate, this represents a restriction of the model, which translates to
the so-called structure condition in the theory of backward SDEs. The structure condition is crucial for
our methodology of characterizing Agent’s path-dependent control problem by means of backward SDEs.
(iv) The weak formulation of the problem is standard in the current continuous-time Principal-Agent litera-
ture. First, as Agent’s effort is impacting the problem only through the induced distribution, the weak
formulation naturally allows for a larger class of controls. Second, Principal’s contract is crucially re-
stricted to be measurable with respect to the output process, thus capturing the differential information
between Agent and Principal. In the present weak formulation, no additional measurability restriction is
needed in order to account for this key-feature of the problem.
3 Reduction to a standard stochastic control problem
This section contains the main results of the present paper.
3.1 Family of restricted contracts
In view of the definition of Agent’s problem in (2.8), it is natural to introduce the Hamiltonian functional,
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Ω and (y, z, γ) ∈ R× Rd × Sd(R):
Ht(x, y, z, γ) := sup
u∈A×B
ht(x, y, z, γ, u), (3.1)
ht(x, y, z, γ, u) := −ct(x, u)− kt(x, u)y + σt(x, b)λt(x, a)·z +
1
2
(σtσ
⊤
t )(x, b) : γ, (3.2)
for u := (a, b) ∈ A×B.
Remark 3.1. (i) The mapping H plays an important role in the theory of stochastic control of Markov
diffusions, see for instance Fleming and Soner [18]. Indeed, suppose that
• the coefficients λt, σt, ct, kt depend on x only through the current value xt,
• the contract ξ depends on x only through the final value xT , i.e. ξ(x) = g(xT ) for some g : Rd −→ R.
Then, under fairly general conditions, the value function of Agent’s problem is given by V A(ξ) = v(0, X0),
where the function v : [0, T ]×Rd −→ R can be characterized as the unique viscosity solution (with appropriate
growth at infinity) of the dynamic programming partial differential equation (called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation)
−∂tv(t, x)−H(t, x, v(t, x), Dv(t, x), D
2v(t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rd, v(T, x) = g(x), x ∈ Rd.
A recently developed theory of path-dependent partial differential equations extends the approach to the non-
Markovian case, see Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [11, 12].
(ii) We may also introduce the dynamic value function of Agent Vt(ξ) by moving initial time to t. In
the Markovian setting of (i), assuming further that the solution v of the HJB equation is C1,2, we have
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Vt(ξ) = v(t, xt) and we obtain by Itoˆ’s formula the following representation of ξ(x) = g(xT ):
g(XT ) = v(0, X0)+
∫ T
0
zt ·dXt+
1
2
γt : d〈X〉t−Ht(Vt, zt, γt)dt, where zt := Dv(t, xt), γt := D
2v(t, xt). (3.3)
This provides the motivation for our approach, inspired from Sannikov [32]: use the dynamic programming
principle satisfied by the value process V (ξ) so as to derive a representation of the contract ξ under the form
(3.3).
We next introduce the norms
‖Z‖p
Hp
:= sup
P∈P
E
P
[(∫ T
0
|σ̂tZt|
2dt
)p/2]
, and ‖Y ‖p
Dp
:= sup
P∈P
E
P
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Yt|
p
]
,
for any F−predictable, Rd−valued process Z and any F−optional, R−valued process Y with ca`dla`g paths.
The following subset of contracts will play a crucial role in our analysis.
Definition 3.2. We denote by V the collection of all F−predictable processes (Z,Γ) : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Rd ×
Sd(R) satisfying
(i) ‖Z‖Hp + ‖Y Z,Γ‖Dp < ∞, for some p > 1, where for an initial value Y0 ∈ R, the process Y Z,Γ is defined
P−a.s. for all P ∈ P by
Y Z,Γt := Y0 +
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr +
1
2
Γr :d〈X〉r −Hr
(
Y Z,Γr , Zr,Γr
)
dr, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.4)
(ii) There exists a weak solution (PZ,Γ, νZ,Γ) ∈ M such that
Ht(Yt, Zt,Γt) = ht
(
Yt, Zt,Γt, ν
Z,Γ
t
)
, dt⊗ PZ,Γ − a.e. on [0, T ]× Ω. (3.5)
Condition (i) guarantees that the process Y Z,Γ of (3.4) is well-defined P−a.s. for all P ∈ P . Indeed,
provided that the integrals on the right hand side are well-defined, notice that, the HamiltonianH is Lipschitz
in the y−variable, due to k being bounded, thus guaranteeing that Y Z,Γ is well-defined as the unique solution
of the ODE with random coefficients (3.4). Next, to see that the integrals are indeed well-defined, we observe
that
Kνt Y
Z,Γ
t −
∫ t
0
Kνr cr(νr)dr = Y0 +
∫ t
0
KνrZr · σr(βr)dW
P
r −A
ν
t , t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s., for all (P, ν) ∈ M, (3.6)
where Aν is a non-decreasing process defined by
Aνt :=
∫ t
0
Kνr
[
Hr(Yr, Zr,Γr)− hr(Yr, Zr,Γr, νr)
]
dr, t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s., for all (P, ν) ∈M.
Hence, the integrability conditions in Definition 3.2 (i) guarantee that (3.4) is well-defined P−a.s., for all
P ∈ P . Then, Y Z,Γ is well-defined by the admissibility condition (2.5). We emphasize that
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr is
defined pathwisely on Ω without exclusion of any null set, as a consequence of the main result of Nutz [27].
This is a crucial fact as our main result below states that Principal’s problem can be reduced to choosing
among contracts of the form ξ = Y Z,ΓT , which requires that such contracts be independent from Agent’s
control model8.
8The existing literature on the continuous time Principal-Agent problem only addresses the case of drift control, so that
admissible control models involve equivalent probability measures. In our context, we allow volatility control, which in turn
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Condition (ii) states that there is a maximizer of the Hamiltonian H , defined in (3.1), which induces an
admissible control model for Agent’s problem. This is a standard technical condition for our verification
argument in Proposition 3.3 below, which is the key-ingredient for our main result. Under this condition, the
next result states that, under contracts of the form ξ = Y Z,ΓT , Agent’s value function coincides with the above
process Y Z,Γ, and the corresponding optimal actions are identified as the maximizers of the Hamiltonian H .
Proposition 3.3. Let Y0 ∈ R and (Z,Γ) ∈ V. Then, Y
Z,Γ
T ∈ C0, and we have:
(i) Y0 = V
A
(
Y Z,ΓT
)
, and any (PZ,Γ, νZ,Γ) ∈ M⋆
(
Y Z,ΓT
)
is optimal;
(ii) (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ M⋆
(
Y Z,ΓT
)
if and only if Ht(Yt, Zt,Γt) = ht(Yt, Zt,Γt, ν
⋆
t ), dt ⊗ P
⋆−a.e. on [0, T ] × Ω, i.e.
the control process ν⋆ is a maximizer of the Hamiltonian on the support of P⋆.
Proof. From the definition of Y Z,ΓT in (3.4), it is clear that this is an FT−measurable random variable.
Consider the expression (3.6) of Y Z,ΓT . Then since the discount rate k is bounded, it follows from Definition
3.2 (i), together with Condition (2.5) on Agent’s cost function, that ξ = Y Z,ΓT satisfies (2.6). Thus Y
Z,Γ
T ∈ C0.
We next prove (i). First, for any M = (P, ν) ∈ M, it follows from a direct application of Itoˆ’s formula
that
E
P
[
KνTY
Z,Γ
T
]
= Y0 − E
P
[ ∫ T
0
Kνr
(
Hr(Y
Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr) + k
νr
r Y
Z,Γ
r − Zs · σ
βr
r λ
αr
r −
1
2
σ̂2r :Γr
)
dr
]
,
where we used the simplifying notation ϕur := ϕr(x, u) for ϕ = k, σ, λ, and where we have used the fact
that since (Z,Γ) ∈ V0, the stochastic integral
∫ ·
0 K
ν
rZr · σ̂rdW
P
r defines a martingale, by the boundedness of
k and σ. By the definition of Agent’s optimization criterion JA, we may write the last equation as
JA
(
M, Y Z,ΓT
)
= Y0 − E
P
[∫ T
0
Kνt
(
Ht
(
Y Z,Γt , Zt,Γt
)
− ht
(
Y Z,Γt , Zt,Γt, νt
))
dt
]
. (3.7)
By the definition of the HamiltonianH in (3.1), this shows that JA
(
M, Y Z,ΓT
)
≤ Y0, and thus V A
(
Y Z,ΓT
)
≤ Y0
by the arbitrariness of M ∈ M. Finally, using the control (PZ,Γ, νZ,Γ) introduced in the admissibility
condition (ii) of Definition 3.2, we see that (3.7) reduces to JA
(
P
Z,Γ, νZ,Γ, Y Z,ΓT
)
= Y0.
We next prove (ii). It follows from (3.7) and the equality V A
(
Y Z,ΓT
)
= Y0, established in (i), that we
must have for all (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈M⋆
(
Y Z,ΓT
)
E
P
⋆
[∫ T
0
Kν
⋆
r
(
Hr(Y
Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr)− hr(Y
Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr, ν
⋆
r )
)
dr
]
= 0.
By the definition of H in (3.1), this holds if and only if ν⋆ is a maximizer of Hr
(
Y Z,Γr , Zr,Γr
)
, dt⊗ P⋆−a.e.
on [0, T ]× Ω.
implies that our set P is not dominated. It is therefore necessary for our approach to have a path-wise definition of stochastic
integrals.
Notice that the classical path-wise stochastic integration results of Bichteler [2] (see also Karandikar [22]) are not sufficient for
our purpose, as we would need to restrict the process Z to have further pathwise regularity. The recent result of Nutz [27] is
perfectly suitable to our context, but uses the notion of medial limits to define the stochastic integral of any predictable process
with respect to any ca`dla`g semi-martingale whose characteristic triplet is absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed reference
measure. The existence of medial limits is not guaranteed under the usual set-theoretic framework ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms
plus the uncountable axiom of choice), and further axioms have to be added. The continuum hypothesis is one among several
sufficient axioms for existence of these limits to hold, see [30, Footnote 3] for further discussion.
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3.2 Restricted Principal’s problem and main reduction result
The result of the last Proposition 3.3 (ii) suggests to introduce, through a classical measurable selection
argument, the maps u⋆t (x, y, z, γ) := (α
⋆, β⋆)t(x, y, z, γ) which maximize H
Ht(x, y, z, γ) = ht
(
x, y, z, γ, u⋆t (x, y, z, γ)
)
.
Since there can be more than one maximizer u⋆, we introduce the set U⋆ of maximizers. Furthermore,
Proposition 3.3 (ii) says that ν⋆t = u
⋆
t (X,Y
Z,Γ
t , Zt,Γt) is well-defined dt⊗P
⋆−a.s. for all (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ M⋆
(
Y Z,ΓT
)
and for all u⋆ ∈ U⋆. These optimal feedback controls induce the following coefficients for the optimal output
process
λ⋆t (x, y, z, γ) := λt
(
x, α⋆t (x, y, z, γ)
)
, σ⋆t (x, y, z, γ) := σt
(
x, β⋆t (x, y, z, γ)
)
. (3.8)
Notice that Proposition 3.3 (ii) says that for all (Z,Γ) ∈ V0 and any u⋆ ∈ U⋆, the following stochastic
differential equation driven by a n−dimensional Brownian motion W
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σ⋆r (X,Y
Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr)
[
λ⋆r(X,Y
Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr)dr + dWr
]
, t ∈ [0, T ], (3.9)
has at least one weak solution (P⋆,Z,Γ, ν⋆,Z,Γ).
The following result on Principal’s value process V P when the contract payoff is ξ = Y Z,ΓT is a direct
consequence of Proposition 3.3, and uses the convention that sup ∅ = −∞.
Proposition 3.4. We have
V P ≥ sup
Y0≥R
V (Y0), where V (Y0) = sup
(Z,Γ)∈V
sup
(P,ν)∈P⋆(Y Z,Γ
T
)
E
P
[
KPt,TU
(
ℓ− Y Z,ΓT
)]
. (3.10)
Our main result below identifies conditions under which the lower bound supY0≥R V (Y0), representing
the maximum Principal’s value when the contracts are restricted to the FT−measurable random variables
Y Z,ΓT with given initial condition Y0 ≥ R, is, in fact equal to the unrestricted Principal’s value V
P . In the
subsequent Section 3.3, we recall how V can be computed, in principle.
Remark 3.5. Since H is convex in (y, z, γ), we have(
σ⋆t λ
⋆
t
)
(Yt, Zt,Γt) ∈ ∂zHt(X,Yt, Zt,Γt) and
(
σ⋆t σ
⋆⊤
t
)
(Yt, Zt,Γt) ∈ 2∂γHt(X,Yt, Zt,Γt),
where ∂z and ∂γ denote the sub-gradient with respect to z and γ, respectively. If in addition H is differentiable
in z and γ, and the Hamiltonian has an interior maximizer characterized by the first order condition, then
we may rewrite the state equation (3.9) as
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
∇zHr(X,Y
Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr)dr +
[
2∇γHr(X,Y
Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr)
] 1
2 dWr, t ∈ [0, T ].
We are now ready for the statement of our main result.
Theorem 3.6. Assume that V 6= ∅. Then, we have
V P = sup
Y0≥R
V (Y0).
Moreover, any maximizer (Y ⋆0 , Z
⋆,Γ⋆) of the problem supY0≥R V (Y0) induces an optimal contract ξ
⋆ :=
Y Z
⋆,Γ⋆
T for Principal’s problem V
P .
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Theorem 3.6 reduces our non-zero sum Stackelberg stochastic differential game to a finite dimensional
maximization of the value function of a standard stochastic control problem which may be addressed by
standard tools from stochastic control theory, see Subsection 3.3. This reduction is obtained by proving
that the restriction of the class of contracts from Ξ to the set
{
Y Z,ΓT , Y0 ≥ R, (Z,Γ) ∈ V
}
does not affect
Principal’s value function.
– The simplest sufficient condition is to show that any ξ ∈ Ξ can be represented as ξ = Y Z,ΓT , P−a.s.
for all P ∈ P0. We shall see in the subsequent subsection that this is, indeed, the case when the volatility
coefficient is not controlled and generates a weak solution satisfying the predictable representation property.
– In the general case of Subsection 5, we shall prove that the last representation result holds for a
convenient approximation ξε of ξ, which will allow Principal to attain the optimal value.
Remark 3.7. The assumption that V is non-empty is important in our case, because otherwise the reduced
problem of the Principal would degenerate and have value −∞. Notice however that this is a rather mild
assumption. For instance, we may ensure that the pair (Z,Γ) = (0, 0), inducing constant contracts, belongs
to V, by by restricting Agent’s cost function c to be strictly convex, coercive, with appropriate regularity.
Remark 3.8. The special case where Agent has no action on the diffusion matrix, with an induced weak
solution satisfying the predictable representation property, is addressed by a direct application of a represen-
tation result from the theory of backward SDEs. We isolate this setting in Section 4 below, see Theorem
4.2.
3.3 HJB characterization of the reduced problem
An advantage of our approach is that, assuming the restriction P⋆(Y Z,ΓT ) 6= ∅ is satisfied and that processes
in V satisfy the admissibility condition of Definition 3.2 (ii), V is a standard stochastic control problem with
control processes (Z,Γ), and controlled state process (X,Y Z,Γ), the controlled dynamics of X given (in weak
formulation) by (3.9), and those of Y Z,Γ given by (3.4)
dY Z,Γt =
(
Zt · σ
⋆
t λ
⋆
t +
1
2
Γt :σ
⋆
t (σ
⋆
t )
⊤−Ht
)
(Y Z,Γt , Zt,Γt)dt+ Zt · σ
⋆
t (Y
Z,Γ
t , Zt,Γt)dW
M
⋆
t . (3.11)
In the Markovian case where the dependence on the path X is only through the current value, we see from
the controlled dynamics (3.9)–(3.11) that the relevant optimization term for the dynamic programming
equation corresponding to the control problem V is defined for (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × R by
G(t, x, y, p,M) := sup
(z,γ)∈R×Sd(R)
sup
u⋆∈U⋆
{
(σ⋆t λ
⋆
t )(x, y, z, γ) · px +
(
z · (σ⋆t λ
⋆
t ) +
γ
2
:σ⋆t (σ
⋆
t )
⊤ −Ht
)
(x, y, z, γ)py
+
1
2
(σ⋆t (σ
⋆
t )
⊤)(x, y, z, γ) :
(
Mxx + zz
⊤Myy
)
+ (σ⋆t (σ
⋆
t )
⊤)(x, y, z, γ)z ·Mxy
}
,
where M =:
(
Mxx Mxy
M⊤xy Myy
)
∈ Sd+1(R), Mxx ∈ Sd(R), Myy ∈ R, Mxy ∈Md,1(R) and p =:
(
px
py
)
∈ Rd × R.
The next statement provides a verification result for the problem V in the Markovian case. As standard
in the stochastic control literature, this requires to assume existence of the maximizers
zˆ(t, x, y, p,M) and γˆ(t, x, y, p,M),
of the Hamiltonian G(t, x, y, p,M). We shall denote by TT the collection of all F−stopping times with values
in [0, T ].
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Theorem 3.9. Consider a Markovian setting and let ϕt(x, .) = ϕt(xt, .) for ϕ = k, k
P , λ⋆, σ⋆, H, and ℓ(x) =
ℓ(xt). Let v ∈ C1,2
(
[0, T ),Rn+1
)
∩ C0
(
[0, T ] × Rd+1
)
be a classical solution of the dynamic programming
equation{
(∂tv − k
P v)(t, x, y) +G
(
t, x, y,Dv(t, x, y), D2v(t, x, y)
)
= 0, (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× Rd × R,
v(T, x, y) = U(ℓ(x)− y), (x, y) ∈ Rd × R.
Assume further that
(i) The family
{
v(τ,Xτ , Yτ )
}
τ∈TT
is P−uniformly integrable for all (P, ν) ∈ P⋆(Y Z,ΓT ) and all (Z,Γ) ∈ V,
(ii) the function G has maximizers zˆ and γˆ such that
• SDE (3.9)–(3.11) with control (Z⋆t ,Γ
⋆
t ) := (zˆ, γˆ)(., Dv,D
2v)(t,Xt, Yt) has a weak solution (P
∗
, ν⋆),
• (Z⋆,Γ⋆) ∈ V0.
Then, V (Y0) = v(0, X0, Y0), and (Z
⋆,Γ⋆) is an optimal control for the problem V .
In general, we see that Principal’s problem involves both x and y as state variables. We consider below
in Section 6 conditions under which the number of state variables can be reduced.
Before closing this section, let us say a few words about the existence of an optimal contract. As
mentioned in Theorem 3.9 above, this boils down to the value function v being regular enough so as to give
a meaning to its partial derivatives with respect to x (for instance weak derivatives in the Sobolev sense
could, in principle, be sufficient), and to use them as feedback in SDE (3.9)–(3.11). In this regard, the
question of existence of an optimal contract is the same as the question of existence in a generic stochastic
control problem; see, e.g., the seminal papers of El Karoui, Huu Nguyen and Jeanblanc-Picque´ [13], and
Haussman and Lepeltier [19].
4 Fixed volatility of the output
We consider here the case in which Agent is only allowed to control the drift of the output process, i.e.
B = {bo}. In this case, we simply denote control models in M by M = (P, α). Clearly, M is non-empty if
and only if the drift-less SDE (2.4)
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X, b
o)dWt, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.1)
has a weak solution (P′, bo). For simplicity, we also assume in this section that
(P′, bo) is the unique weak solution of (4.1);
moreover, (P′,FP
′
+ ) satisfies the predictable representation property
and the Blumenthal zero-one law,
(4.2)
where the filtration FP
′
+ is the P
′−completion of the right-limit of F9.
We observe that all existing literature on the continuous time Principle-Agent problem falls under this
framework, and we emphasize again that our main result does not require this condition.
Remark 4.1. The predictable martingale representation property holds, for instance, if x 7−→ σt(x, bo) is
Lipschitz, for the uniform topology on Ω, uniformly in t, see Theorem 4.2 in Ren, Touzi and Zhang [31].
9For a semi-martingale probability measure P, we denote by Ft+ := ∩s>tFs its right-continuous limit, and by F
P
t+ the corre-
sponding completion under P. The completed right-continuous filtration is denoted by FP+.
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In the present context, all control models M = (P, α) ∈M are equivalent to the measure P′, and defined
by the density
dP
dP′
∣∣∣∣
FT
= exp
(∫ T
0
λr(X,αr)dr +
1
2
∫ T
0
|λr(X,αr)|
2dr
)
.
The Hamiltonian H reduces to
Ht(x, y, z, γ) =
1
2
(σtσ
⊤
t )(x, b
o) : γ + F ot (x, y, z), F
o
t (x, y, z) := sup
a∈A
fot (x, y, z, a),
fot (x, y, z, a) := −ct(x, a, b
o)− kt(x, a, b
o)y + σt(x, b
o)λt(x, a) · z,
so that the reduced contract is defined by
Y Zt := Y
Z,0
t = Y0 −
∫ t
0
F os
(
X,Y Zs , Zs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
Zs · dXs, t ∈ [0, T ], P
′ − a.s.,
where the dependence on the process Γ disappears. In order to prove Theorem 3.6, we shall now justify that
any contract ξ ∈ Ξ can be represented in the form ξ = Y ZT , P
′−a.s. thus reducing our result to the problem
of solving the following backward SDE:
Y0 = ξ +
∫ T
0
F os
(
X,Y Zs , Zs
)
ds−
∫ T
0
Zs · dXs, P
′ − a.s. (4.3)
For the next statement, we recall that the inclusion {Y ZT : Y0 ≥ R and (Z, 0) ∈ V
}
⊂ Ξ is obvious by
definition.
Theorem 4.2. Let B = {bo} be such that the corresponding driftless SDE (4.1) satisfies Condition (4.2),
and assume that V 6= ∅. Then, Ξ = {Y ZT : Y0 ≥ R and (Z, 0) ∈ V
}
. In particular, V P = supY0≥R V (Y0).
Proof. The condition V 6= ∅ implies that Ξ 6= ∅. For all ξ ∈ Ξ, we observe that condition (2.6) implies
that ξ ∈ Lp
′
(P′) for some p′ > 1, by the Ho¨lder inequality and the boundedness of λ. Furthermore, the
boundedness of k, σ and λ implies that F o is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous in (y, z) and, by the H’´older
inequality and (2.5), we may find p > p′′ > 1 such that:
E
P
′
[∫ T
0
|F ot (0, 0)|
p′′dt
]
= EP
′
[ ∫ T
0
inf
u∈A×B
ct(u)
p′′dt
]
≤ sup
(P,ν)∈M
E
P
[∫ T
0
ct(νt)
pdt
]
<∞.
Then, as P′ satisfies the predictable martingale representation property and the zero-one law, the standard
theory of backward SDEs guarantees existence and uniqueness of the representation (4.3) in Lp¯([0, T ]×Ω),
with p¯ := p′ ∧ p′′, see Pardoux and Peng [29] in the case p¯ = 2, or Briand et al. [4] for p¯ > 1.
Finally, (Z, 0) satisfies Condition (i) of Definition 3.2 by the Ho¨lder inequality. Moreover, since ξ =
Y ZT ∈ Ξ, it follows from Proposition 3.3 that (Z, 0) satisfies also Condition (ii) of Definition 3.2. Hence
(Z, 0) ∈ V .
5 The general case
In this section, we extend the proof of Theorem 4.2 to the general context of Theorem 3.6 which bypasses
Condition (4.2) in the un-controlled diffusion framework, and covers the case where Agent controls both the
drift and the volatility of the output process X .
Similarly to the previous section, the critical tool is the theory of backward SDEs, but the control of
volatility requires to invoke their recent extension to the second order case.
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For technical reasons, we need to introduce the universal filtration FU =
(
FUt
)
0≤t≤T
defined by FUt :=
∩P∈Prob(Ω)F
P
t , t ∈ [0, T ], and we denote by F
U
+, the corresponding right-continuous limit. Moreover, for a
subset Π ⊂ Prob(Ω), we introduce the set of Π−polar sets NΠ :=
{
N ⊂ Ω, N ⊂ A for some A ∈ FT with
sup
P∈Π P(A) = 0
}
, and we introduce the Π−completion of F
F
Π :=
(
FΠt
)
t∈[0,T ]
, with FΠt := F
U
t ∨ σ
(
NΠ
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
together with the corresponding right-continuous limit FΠ+.
5.1 From fully nonlinear to semilinear Hamiltonian
For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, define
Σt(x, b) := (σtσ
⊤
t )(x, b), and Σt(x) :=
{
Σt(x, b) ∈ S
+
d (R) : b ∈ B
}
, (5.1)
We also introduce the inverse map which assigns to every squared diffusion the corresponding set of gener-
ating controls:
Bt(x,Σ) :=
{
b ∈ B, σtσ
⊤
t (x, b) = Σ
}
, Σ ∈ Σt(x),
so that we may isolate the partial maximization with respect to the squared diffusion in the Hamiltonian H
in (3.1), and define for any (y, z, γ,Σ) ∈ R× Rd × Sd(R)× S
+
d (R)
Ht(x, y, z, γ) = sup
Σ∈Σt(x)
{
Ft
(
x, y, z,Σ
)
+
1
2
Σ:γ
}
,
Ft(x, y, z,Σ) := sup
(a,b)∈A×Bt(x,Σ)
{
− ct(x, a, b)− kt(x, a, b)y + σt(x, b)λt(x, a)·z
}
.
(5.2)
In other words, 2H = (−2F )∗ is the convex conjugate of −2F .
5.2 Isolating the control on quadratic variation
Following the approach of Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36] to second order backward SDEs, we start by Agent’s
problem so as to isolate the control of the quadratic variation of the output. To do this, recall the notation
(5.1), and let Σt(x, b)
1/2 be the corresponding (d, d)−symmetric square root. We observe that the driftless
SDE (2.4) can be converted into
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
Σt(X, βt)
1/2dW ot , t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.3)
Indeed, any solution (P, β) of (2.4) is also a solution of (5.3) by the Le´vy characterization of Brownian
motion. Conversely, let (P, β) be a solution of (5.3), and let W := (W o,W 1) be an n−dimensional Brownian
motion extending the original Brownian motion W o. Let Rn denote the set of all matrices of rotations R
of Rn, i.e. RR⊤ = In, and let R
o denote the (d, n)−matrix consisting of the d first rows of R, and R1
the (n − d, n)−matrix consisting of the n − d remaining rows of R. Notice that dWt = R⊤dW t defines
a Brownian motion, again by the Le´vy characterization of Brownian motion. Let {Rt, t ∈ [0, T ]} be an
Rn−valued optional process with R
0
t (x) := Σt(x, βt)
−1/2σt(x, βt). Here, Σt(x, βt)
−1/2 denotes the pseudo-
inverse of Σt(x, βt)
1/2. Then, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
Σt(X, βt)
1/2dW ot = X0 +
∫ t
0
Σt(X, βt)
1/2R0t (x, βt)dWt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σt(X, βt)dWt,
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which means that (P, β) is a solution of the SDE (2.4). Let
Po :=
{
P
o ∈ Prob(Ω) : (Po, β) weak solution of (2.4) for some β
}
,
and we observe that for all weak solution (Po, β) of (2.4), we have
σˆ2t ∈ Σt :=
{
Σt(b) : b ∈ B}, and βt ∈ Bt(σˆ
2
t ) :=
{
b ∈ B : Σt(b) = σˆ
2
t }, P
o − a.s.
Similar to the previous Section 4, for any fixed diffusion coefficient, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the solutions of (2.1) and (2.4) characterized by means of the Girsanov theorem. From the above
discussion, we see that, by introducing
U(Po) :=
{
ν = (α, β) F− optional processes, α ∈ A, β ∈ B
(
σˆ2
)
, on [0, T ],Po − a.s.
}
,
we may define a one-to-one correspondence between the set of control models M and the set
Mo :=
{
(Po, ν), Po ∈ Po and ν ∈ U(Po)
}
,
as follows: for (Po, ν) ∈Mo, define Pν by
dPν
dPo
∣∣∣∣
FT
= E
(∫ .
0
λt(αt) · dWt
)
T
= E
(∫ .
0
Rot (βt)λt(αt) · dW
o
t +R
1
tλt(αt) · dW
1
t
)
T
= E
(∫ .
0
Σt(βt)
−1/2σt(βt)λt(αt) · dW
o
t +R
1
tλt(αt) · dW
1
t
)
T
. (5.4)
Then, it follows from the Girsanov theorem that (Pν , ν) ∈ M. Notice that the choice of R1 is irrelevant.
We may then re-write Agent’s problem as
V A(ξ) = sup
Po∈Po
V A(ξ,Po), where V A(ξ,Po) := sup
ν∈U(Po)
E
P
ν
[
KνT ξ −
∫ T
0
Kνt ct(νt)dt
]
.
We conclude this subsection by providing a formal derivation of the representation needed for the proof of
our main Theorem 3.6. The rigorous justification is reported in the subsequent subsections by means of
second order backward SDEs.
For all fixed Po ∈ Po, the value V A(ξ,Po) is that of a stochastic control problem with fixed quadratic
variation. By the same argument as that of the previous section, we have the backward SDE representation
V A(ξ,Po) = Y P
o
0 = ξ +
∫ T
0
Ft(Y
P
o
t , Z
P
o
t , σˆ
2
t )dt−
∫ T
0
ZP
o
t · dXt, P
o − a.s.
Since V A(ξ) is the supremum of V A(ξ,Po) over Po ∈ Po, we next justify from the dynamic programming
principle that the corresponding dynamic value function satisfies an appropriate Po−super-martingale prop-
erty under each Po ∈ Po, which by the Doob-Meyer decomposition leads to the representation:
V A(ξ) = Y0 = ξ +
∫ T
0
Ft(Yt, Zt, σˆ
2
t )dt−
∫ T
0
Zt · dXt +KT , P
o-a.s for all Po ∈ Mo, (5.5)
where Ztd〈X〉t = d〈Y,X〉t, and K is non-decreasing, Po−a.s for all Po ∈ Po. Moreover, if Po
⋆
is an optimal
measure in Po, then V A(ξ) = V A(ξ,Po
⋆
), and therefore K = 0, Po
⋆
−a.s. In general, there is no guarantee
that such an optimal measure exists, and we therefore account for the minimality of K through the condition
inf
Po∈Po
E
P
o
[KT ] = 0. (5.6)
This is exactly the representation that we will obtain rigorously from second order backward SDEs, and
that we will exploit in order to prove our main Theorem 3.6.
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Remark 5.1. Another formal justification of our approach is the following. Suppose that the representation
ξ = Y Z,ΓT = Y0 +
∫ T
0
Zt · dXt +
1
2
Γt : d〈X〉t −Ht(Yt, Zt,Γt)dt, P
o − a.s. for all Po ∈ Po,
holds true, recall that all measures in P are equivalent to some corresponding measure on Po. Recall the
definition of F in (5.2), and define
K˙t := Ht(Yt, Zt,Γt)− Ft
(
Yt, Zt, σ̂
2
t
)
−
1
2
σ̂2t : Γt, t ∈ [0, T ].
By direct substitution in the above representation of ξ, we get
ξ = Y Z,ΓT = Y0 +
∫ T
0
Zt · dXt −
∫ T
0
Ft
(
Yt, Zt, σ̂
2
t
)
dt−
∫ T
0
K˙tdt, P
o − a.s. for all P ∈ Po,
By definition of F , notice that K˙t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], and K˙t vanishes whenever σ̂2t achieves the maximum
in the definition of H in terms of F , i.e. on the support of any measure under which the density of the
quadratic variation is such a maximizer. Since the supremum may not be attained, we write as a substitute
inf
Po∈Po
E
P
o[
KT
]
= 0, with Kt :=
∫ t
0
K˙sds, t ∈ [0, T ].
The last representation of ξ by means of the triplet (Y, Z,K) differs from (5.5) only by the slight relaxation
on the non-decreasing process K dropping the requirement of absolute continuity with respect to the Lebesgue
measure.
5.3 2BSDE characterization of Agent’s problem
We now provide a representation of Agent’s value function by means of second order backward SDEs (2BS-
DEs, hereafter) as introduced by Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36]. We use crucially recent results of Possama¨ı,
Tan and Zhou [30], to bypass the regularity conditions in [36].
Given an admissible contract ξ, we consider the following 2BSDE
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
Fs(Ys, Zs, σ̂
2
s )ds−
∫ T
t
Zs · dXs +
∫ T
t
dKs, P
o − a.s. for all Po ∈ Po. (5.7)
The following definition recalls the notion of 2BSDE, and uses the additional notation
Pot (P
o,F+) :=
{
P
′ ∈ Po, Po[E] = P′[E] for all E ∈ F+t
}
; Po ∈ Po, t ∈ [0, T ].
Definition 5.2. We say that (Y, Z,K) is a solution of the 2BSDE (5.7) if, for some p > 1,
(i) Y is a ca`dla`g and FP0+ −optional process, with ‖Y ‖
p
Dop
:= sup
Po∈Po E
P
o [
supt≤T |Yt|
p
]
<∞;
(ii) Z is an FP
o
−predictable process, with ‖Z‖p
h
o
p
:= sup
Po∈Po E
P
o[( ∫ T
0 Z
⊤
t σ̂
2
tZtdt
) p
2
]
<∞;
(iii) K is a FP
o
−optional, non-decreasing, starting from K0 = 0, and satisfying the minimality condition
Kt = essinf
P
o
P′∈Pot (P
o,F+)
E
P
′[
KT
∣∣FPo+t ], 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Po − a.s. for all Po ∈ Po. (5.8)
This definition differs slightly from that of Soner, Touzi and Zhang [36] and Possama¨ı, Tan and Zhou
[30], as the non-decreasing process K is here assumed to be aggregated. This is possible due to Nutz’s
[27] aggregation result of stochastic integrals, which holds true under the continuum hypothesis which is
assumed to hold in the present paper. Since the processes Y and Z are aggregated, the fact that
∫
Z · dX
is aggregated implies that the remaining term K in the decomposition (5.7) is also aggregated.
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Proposition 5.3. For all ξ ∈ C0, the 2BSDE (5.7) has a unique solution (Y, Z,K).
Proof. In order to verify the well-posedness conditions of Possama¨ı, Tan & Zhou [30], we introduce the
dynamic version Mo(t, x) and Po(t, x) of the sets Mo,Po, by considering the SDE (5.3) on [t, T ] starting
at time t from the path x ∈ Ω.
(i) We first verify that the family {Po(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω} is saturated, in the terminology of [30,
Definition 5.1], i.e. for all Po1 ∈ P
o(t, x), and Po2 ∼ P
o
1 under which X is a P
o
2−martingale, we must have
P
o
2 ∈ P
o(t, x). To see this, notice that the equivalence between Po1 and P
o
2 implies that the quadratic
variation of X is not changed by passing from Po1 to P
o
2. Since X is a P
o
2−martingale, it follows that if
(Po1, β) ∈M
o(t, x) then (Po2, β) ∈M
o(t, x).
(ii) Since k, σ, λ are bounded, it follows from the definition of admissible controls that F satisfies the
integrability and Lipschitz continuity assumptions required in [30]. Indeed,
– For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, and Σ ∈ Σt(x)∣∣Ft(x, y, z,Σ)− Ft(x, y′, z′,Σ)∣∣ ≤ |k|∞|y − y′|+ |λ|∞ sup
b∈Bt(x,Σ)
∣∣σt(x, b)⊤(z − z′)∣∣
= |k|∞|y − y
′|+ |λ|∞
∣∣Σ1/2(z − z′)∣∣, (y, z), (y′, z′) ∈ R× Rd.
– We also directly check from Condition (2.5) on the cost function c, together with [35, Lemma 6.2] that
sup
Po∈Po
E
P
o
[
essupP
o
0≤t≤T
(
E
P
o
[∫ T
0
∣∣Fs(0, 0, σ̂2s)∣∣κds∣∣∣Ft+
]) p
κ
]
<∞, for some p > κ ≥ 1.
– The dynamic programming requirements of [30, Assumption 2.1] follow from the more general results
given in El Karoui and Tan [15, 16] (see also Nutz and van Handel [28]).
– Finally, as ξ satisfies the integrability condition (2.6) for some p > 1, the required well-posedness result
is a direct consequence of [35, Lemma 6.2] together with [30, Theorems 4.1 and 5.1].
We now relate Agent’s problem to the 2BSDE.
Proposition 5.4. Let (Y, Z,K) be the solution of the 2BSDE (5.7). Then, V A(ξ) = sup
P∈P0 E
P [Y0] .
Moreover, (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈M⋆(ξ) if and only if
• ν⋆ is a maximizer of F
(
X,Y, Z, σˆ2
)
, dt⊗ P⋆−a.e.
• KT = 0, P⋆−a.s., or equivalently Po
⋆
−a.s. where Po
⋆
is defined from P⋆ as in (5.4).
Proof. (i) By [30, Theorem 4.2], the solution of the 2BSDE (5.7) is the supremum of solutions of BSDEs:
Y0 = essup
P
P′∈Po(Po,F+)
YP
′
0 , P− a.s. for all P
o ∈ Po, (5.9)
where for all Po ∈ Po, (YP
o
,ZP
o
) is the solution of the backward SDE under Po:
YP
o
0 = ξ +
∫ T
0
Fs(Y
P
o
r ,Z
P
o
r , σ̂
2
r )dr −
∫ T
0
ZP
o
r · dXr −
∫ T
0
dMP
o
r , P
o − a.s.
with a ca`dla`g (FP
o
+ ,P
o)−martingaleMP
o
orthogonal to X , i.e. d〈MP
o
, X〉 = 0, Po−a.s. For all (Po, ν) ∈Mo,
consider the linear backward SDE with
YP
o,ν
0 = ξ +
∫ T
0
(
−cνr − k
ν
rY
P
o,ν
r + σ
β
r λ
α
r ·Z
P
o,ν
r
)
dr −
∫ T
0
ZP
o,ν
r · dXr −
∫ T
0
dMP
o,ν
r , P
o − a.s. (5.10)
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where cνr := cr(νr) and similar notations apply to k
ν , σβ , λα. Let Pν be the probability measure, equivalent
to P, defined as in (5.4). Then, it follows from Girsanov’s theorem that
YP
o,ν
0 = E
P
ν
[
KνT ξ −
∫ T
0
Kνs c
ν
sds
∣∣∣∣∣F+0
]
, Po − a.s.
We now observe the conditions of Corollary 3.1 in El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [14] are satisfied in our
context, namely, the affine generators in (5.10) are equi-Lipschitz and there is an ε−maximizer νˆo ∈ U(Po)
for all ε > 0 which obviously induces a weak solution of the corresponding SDE by the Girsanov theorem.
This provides a representation of YP
o
0 as a stochastic control representation for all P
o ∈ Po:
YP
o
0 = essup
P
o
ν∈U(Po)
YP
o,ν
0 = essup
P
o
ν∈U(Po)
E
P
ν
[
KνT ξ −
∫ T
0
Kνs c
ν
sds
∣∣∣∣∣F+0
]
, Po − a.s., (5.11)
see also [30, Lemma A.3]. We observe here that the presence of the orthogonal martingale MP
o
does not
induce any change in the argument of [14]. Then, for all Po ∈ Po, we have Po−a.s.
Y0 = essup
P
o
(P′,ν)∈P0(Po,F+)×U(P′)
E
P
′ν
[
KνT ξ −
∫ T
t
Kνs c
ν
sds
∣∣∣∣∣F+0
]
= essupP
o
(P′, ν) ∈ M
P
′ = Po on F+0
E
P
′
[
KνT ξ −
∫ T
0
Kνs c
ν
sds
∣∣∣∣∣F+0
]
,
where the last equality follows from the decomposition of Subsection 5.2. By similar arguments as in the
proofs of Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 5.2 of [30], we may then conclude that V A(ξ) = sup
Po∈P0 E
P
o
[Y0].
(ii) By the above equalities, an optimal control must be such that all the essential suprema above are
attained. The one in (5.9) is clearly attained if and only if the corresponding measure in Po is such that
K = 0 on its support. Similarly, by the result of El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [14], the supremum in (5.11)
is attained for control processes which maximize F .
5.4 Proof of Theorem 3.6
The last statement of the theorem, characterizing optimal contracts by means of the solution of the reduced
problem infY0≥R V (Y0), is a direct consequence of the equality V
P = supY0≥R V (Y0). The inequality
V P ≥ supY0≥R V (Y0) was already stated in Proposition 3.4. To prove the converse inequality we recall that
the conditiopn V 6= ∅ implies that Ξ 6= ∅. For an arbitrary ξ ∈ Ξ, our strategy is to prove that Principal’s
objective function JP (ξ) can be approximated by JP (ξε), where ξε = Y Z
ε,Γε
T for some (Z
ε,Γε) ∈ V .
Step 1: Let (Y, Z,K) be the solution of the 2BSDE (5.7), where we recall again that the aggregated
process K exists as a consequence of the aggregation result of Nutz [27], see [30, Remark 4.1]. We recall
that the integrability condition (2.6) implies that ‖Y ‖Do
p′
+ ‖Z‖ho
p′
<∞, for some p′ ∈ (1, p), where p > 1 is
the exponent associated to ξ, see (2.6).
By Proposition 5.4, for every (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ M⋆(ξ), we have KT = 0, P⋆ − a.s. Fix some ε > 0, and define
the absolutely continuous approximation of K
Kεt :=
1
ε
∫ t
(t−ε)+
Ksds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Clearly, Kε is FP
o
−predictable, non-decreasing Po−q.s. and
KεT = 0, P
⋆ − a.s. for all (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈M⋆(ξ). (5.12)
We next define for any t ∈ [0, T ] the process
Y εt := Y0 −
∫ t
0
Fr(Y
ε
r , Zr, σ̂
2
r )dr +
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr −
∫ t
0
dKεr , (5.13)
and verify that (Y ε, Z,Kε) solves the 2BSDE (5.7) with terminal condition ξε := Y εT and generator F .
Indeed, since KεT ≤ KT , we verify that supPo∈Po E
P
o[
|ξε|p
′]
< ∞, and that Kε does satisfy the required
minimality condition, which is obvious by (5.12). By another application of Lemma 6.2 in Soner, Touzi and
Zang [35], we have the estimates
‖Y ε‖Dop¯ + ‖Z‖hop¯ <∞, for p¯ ∈ (1, p
′). (5.14)
We finally observe that the solutions of the minimality condition for K and for Kε exactly coincide.
Step 2: For (t, x, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω× R× Rd, notice that the map
γ 7−→ Ht(x, y, z, γ)− Ft(x, y, z, σ̂
2
t (x)) −
1
2
σ̂2t (x) : γ is surjective on (0,∞). (5.15)
Indeed, it is non-negative, by definition of H and F , convex, continuous on the interior of its domain, and
is coercive by the boundedness of λ, σ, k.
Let K˙ε denote the density of the absolutely continuous process Kε with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Applying a classical measurable selection argument, we may deduce the existence of an F−predictable process
Γε such that
K˙εt = Ht(Y
ε
t , Zt,Γ
ε
t )− Ft(Y
ε
t , Zt, σ̂
2
t )−
1
2
σ̂2t : Γ
ε
t .
For K˙εt > 0, this is a consequence of (5.15). In the alternative case K˙
ε
t = 0, as M
⋆(ξ) = M⋆(ξε) 6= ∅, it
follows from Proposition 5.4 that Γεt can be chosen arbitrarily, and one may for instance fix Γ
ε
t = 0 in this
case.
Substituting in (5.13), it follows that the following representation of Y ε holds
Y εt = Y0 −
∫ t
0
Hr(Y
ε
r , Zr,Γ
ε
r)dr +
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr +
1
2
∫ t
0
Γεr :d〈X〉r,
so that the contract ξε := Y εT takes the required form (3.4). Then, it follows from (5.14) that the corre-
sponding controlled process (Z,Γε) satisfies the integrability condition required in Definition 3.2. Notice
now that for any (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ M⋆(ξ), we have Y ε = Y , P⋆−a.s., since K = Kε = 0, P⋆−a.s. In particular,
this means that (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ M⋆(ξε). Therefore, by Propositions 3.3 and 5.4, we deduce that Condition (ii)
of Definition 3.2 is also satisfied with our choice of Γε. Hence (Z,Γε) ∈ V . By Proposition 3.3, Agent’s
problem is explicitly solved with the contract ξε, and we have V A(ξε) = Y0. Moreover, it follows from (5.12)
that for every (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈M⋆(ξ), we have ξ = ξε, P⋆ − a.s. Consequently, for any (P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ M⋆(ξ), we have
E
P
⋆[
KPT U(ℓ− ξ
ε)
]
= EP
⋆[
KPT U(ℓ− ξ)
]
,
which implies that JP (ξ) = JP (ξε). By arbitrariness of ξ, this implies supY0≥R V (Y0) ≥ V
P .
6 Special cases and examples
6.1 Coefficients independent of x
In Theorem 3.9, we saw that Principal’s problem involves both x and y as state variables. We now identify
conditions under which Principal’s problem can be somewhat simplified, for example by reducing the number
of state variables. We first provide conditions under which Agent’s participation constraint is binding.
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We assume that
σ, λ, c, k, and kP are independent of x. (6.1)
In this case, the Hamiltonian H introduced in (3.1) is also independent of x, and we re-write the dynamics
of the controlled process Y Z,Γ as
Y Z,Γs := Y0 −
∫ s
0
Hr
(
Y Z,Γr , Zr,Γr
)
dr +
∫ s
0
Zr · dXr +
1
2
∫ s
0
Γr :d〈X〉r, s ∈ [0, T ].
By classical comparison result of stochastic differential equation, this implies that the flow Y Z,Γs is increasing
in terms of the corresponding initial condition Y0. Thus, optimally, Principal will provide Agent with the
minimum reservation utility R he requires. In other words, we have the following simplification of Principal’s
problem, as a direct consequence of Theorem 3.6.
Proposition 6.1. Assuming (6.1), we have V P = V (R).
We now consider cases in which the number of state variables is reduced.
Example 6.2 (Exponential utility).
(i) Let U(y) := −e−ηy, and assume k ≡ 0. Then, under the conditions of Proposition 6.1, it follows that
V P = eηRV (0).
Consequently, the HJB equation of Theorem 3.9, corresponding to V , may be reduced to two state variables
by applying the change of variables v(t, x, y) = eηyf(t, x).
(ii) Assume in addition that, for some h ∈ Rd, the liquidation function is linear, ℓ(x) = h · x. Then, it
follows that
V P = e−η(h·X0−R)f(0),
where the HJB equation of Theorem 3.9 corresponding to V has been reduced to an ODE on [0, T ] by applying
the change of variables v(t, x, y) = e−η(h·x−R)f(t).
Example 6.3 (Risk-neutral Principal). Let U(x) := x, and assume k ≡ 0. Then, under the conditions of
Proposition 6.1, it follows that
V P = −R+ V (0).
Consequently, the HJB equation of Theorem 3.9 corresponding to V can be reduced to [0, T ]×Rd by applying
the change of variables v(t, x, y) = −y + f(t, x).
6.2 Drift control and quadratic cost: Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang [8]
We now consider the only tractable case from Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang [8].
Suppose ξ = UA(CT ) where UA is Agent’s utility function, and CT is the contract payment. Then, we need
to replace ξ by U−1A (ξ), where the inverse function is assumed to exist. Assume that d = n = 1 and, for
some constants c > 0, σ > 0,
σ(x, β) ≡ σ, λ = λ(α) = α, k = kP ≡ 0, ℓ(x) = x, c(t, α) = −
1
2
cα2.
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That is, the volatility is uncontrolled (as in Section 4) and the output is of the form
dXt = σαtdt+ σdW
α
t ,
and Agent and Principal are respectively maximizing
E
P
[
UA(CT )−
c
2
∫ T
0
α2tdt
]
and EP [UP (XT − CT )] ,
denoting Principal utility UP instead of U . In particular, and this is important for tractability, the cost of
drift effort α is quadratic.
We recover the following result from [8] using our approach, and under a different set of technical conditions.
Proposition 6.4. Assume that Principal’s value function v(t, x, y) is the solution of its corresponding HJB
equation, in which the supremum over (z, γ) is attained at the solution (z⋆, γ⋆) to the first order conditions,
and that v is in class C2,3,3 on its domain, including at t = T . Then, we have, for some constant L,
vy(t,Xt, Yt) = −
1
c
v(t,Xt, Yt)− L.
In particular, the optimal contract CT satisfies the following equation, almost surely,
U˜ ′P (XT − CT )
U ′A(CT )
=
1
c
UP (XT − CT ) + L. (6.2)
Moreover, if this equation has a unique solution CT = C(XT ), if the BSDE under the Wiener measure P0
Pt = e
UA(C(XT ))/c −
∫ T
t
1
c
PsZsdXs, t ∈ [0, T ],
has a unique solution (P,Z), and if Agent’s value function is the solution of its corresponding HJB equation
in which the supremum over α is attained at the solution α⋆ to the first order condition, then the contract
C(XT ) is optimal.
Thus, the optimal contract CT is a function of the terminal value XT only. This can be considered as
a moral hazard modification of the Borch rule valid in the so-called first best case: the ratio of Principal’s
and Agent’s marginal utilities is constant under first best risk-sharing, that is, in the case in which Principal
can herself choose Agent’s effort, but here, that ratio is a linear function of the Principal’s utility.
Proof. Agent’s Hamiltonian is maximized by α⋆(z) = 1cσz. The HJB equation for Principal’s value
function v = vP of Theorem 3.9 becomes then, with U = UP ,∂tv + supz∈R
{
1
c
σ2zvx +
1
2c
σ2z2vy +
1
2
σ2
(
vxx + z
2vyy
)
+ σ2zvxy
}
= 0,
v(T, x, y) = UP (x− U
−1
A (y)).
Optimizing over z gives
z⋆ = −
vx + cvxy
vy + cvyy
.
We have that v(t,Xt, Yt) is a martingale under the optimal measure P , satisfying
dvt = σ(vx + z
⋆vy)dWt.
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Thus, the volatility of v is σ times
vx + z
⋆vy =
c(vxvyy − vyvxy)
vy + cvyy
.
We also have, by Ito¯’s rule,
dvy =
(
∂tvy +
1
c
σ2z⋆vxy +
1
2c
σ2(z⋆)2vyy +
1
2
σ2
(
vxxy + (z
⋆)2vyyy
)
+ σ2z⋆vxyy
)
dt+ σ(vxy + z
⋆vyy)dWt,
vy(T, x, y) = −
U ′P (x− U
−1
A (y))
U ′A(U
−1
A (y))
.
Thus, the volatility of vy is σ times
vxy + z
⋆vyy =
vxyvy − vyyvx
vy + cvyy
,
that is, equal to the minus volatility of v divided by c. For the first statement, it only remains to prove that
the drift of vy(t,Xt, Yt) is zero. This drift is equal to
∂tvy − σ
2 vx/c+ vxy
vy/c+ vyy
(vxy/c+ vxyy) +
1
2
σ2
(vx/c+ vxy)
2
(vy/c+ vyy)2
(vyy/c+ vyyy) +
1
2
σ2vxxy.
However, note that the HJB equation can be written as
∂tv =
σ2
2
(
(vx/c+ vxy)
2
vy/c+ vyy
− vxx
)
,
and that differentiating it with respect to y gives
∂tvy =
σ2
2
(
2(vx/c+ vxy)(vxy/c+ vxyy)(vy/c+ vyy)− (vx/c+ vxy)2(vyy/c+ vyyy)
(vy/c+ vyy)2
− vxxy
)
.
Using this, it is readily seen that the above expression for the drift is equal to zero.
Next, denoting by W 0 the Brownian motion for which dXt = σdW
0
t , from (3.4) we have
dYt = −
1
2c
σ2(Z⋆t )
2dt+ σZ⋆t dW
0
t ,
and thus, by Itoˆ’s rule
deYt/c =
1
c
eYt/cσZ⋆t dW
0
t .
Suppose now the offered contract CT = C(XT ) is the one determined by equation (6.2). Agent’s optimal
effort is αˆ = σV Ax /c, where Agent’s value function V
A satisfies
∂tV
A +
1
2c
σ2(V Ax )
2 +
1
2
σ2V Axx = 0.
Using Ito’s rule, this implies that the P0−martingale processes eV
A(t,Xt)/c and eY (t)/c satisfy the same
stochastic differential equation. Moreover, they are equal almost surely at t = T because V A(T,XT ) =
YT = UA(C(XT )), hence, by the uniqueness of the solution of the BSDE, they are equal for all t, and,
furthermore, V Ax (t,Xt) = Z
⋆(t). This implies that Agent’s effort αˆ induced by C(XT ) is the same as the
effort α⋆ optimal for Principal, and both Agent and Principal get their optimal expected utilities.
We now present a completely solvable example of the above model from [8], solved here using our
approach.
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Example 6.5. Risk-neutral principal and logarithmic agent [8]. In addition to the above assump-
tions, suppose, for notational simplicity, that c = 1. Assume also that Principal is risk-neutral while Agent
is risk averse with
UP (CT ) = XT − CT , UA(CT ) = logCT .
We also assume that the model for X is, with σ > 0 being a positive constant,
dXt = σαtXtdt+ σXtdW
α
t .
Thus, Xt > 0 for all t. We will show that the optimal contract payoff CT satisfies
CT =
1
2
XT + const.
This can be seen directly from (6.2), or as follows. Similarly as in the proof above (replacing σ with σx),
the HJB equation of Theorem 3.9 is
∂tv =
σ2x2
2
(
(vx + vxy)
2
vy + vyy
− vxx
)
, v(T, x, y) = x− ey.
It is straightforward to verify that the solution is given by
v(t, x, y) = x− ey +
1
4
e−yx2
(
eσ
2(T−t) − 1
)
.
We have, denoting E(t) := eσ
2(T−t) − 1,
vx = 1 +
1
2
E(t)e−yx, vxy = −vx − 1, vy = −e
y −
1
4
E(t)e−yx2, vyy = −e
y +
1
4
E(t)e−yx2,
and therefore
z⋆ =
1
2
e−y, α⋆ =
1
2
σe−y.
Hence, from (3.4),
dYt = −
1
8
σ2e−2Ytdt+
1
2
e−YtdXt, and d(e
Y
t ) =
1
2
dXt.
Since eYT = CT , we get CT =
1
2XT + const.
6.3 Volatility control with no cost: Cadenillas, Cvitanic´ and Zapatero [5]
We now apply our method to the main model of interest in Cadenillas, Cvitanic´ and Zapatero [5]. That
paper considered the risk-sharing problem between Agent and Principal, when choosing the first best choice
of volatility βt, with no moral hazard, that is, the case in which Principal chooses both the contract and the
effort of Agent. In that case, it is possible to apply convex duality methods to solve the problem 10.
Suppose again that ξ = UA(CT ) where UA is Agent’s utility function, and CT is the contract payment.
Assume also for some constants c > 0, σ > 0 that the output is of the form, for a one-dimensional Brownian
motion W ,11 and a fixed constant λ,
dXt = λβtdt+ βtdWt.
10Those methods do not work for the general setup of the current paper, which provides a method for Principal-Agent problems
with volatility choice that enables us to solve both the special, first best case of [5], and the second best, moral hazard case; the
special case of moral hazard with CARA utility functions and linear output dynamics is solved using the method of this paper in
Cvitanic´, Possama¨ı and Touzi [7].
11The n−dimensional case with n > 1 is similar.
24
We assume that Agent is maximizing E[UA(CT )] and Principal is maximizing E[UP (XT−CT )]. In particular,
there is zero cost of volatility effort β. This is a standard model for portfolio management, in which β has
the interpretation of the vector of positions in risky assets.
Since there is no cost of effort, first best is attained, i.e., Principal can offer a constant payoff C such that
UA(C) = R, and Agent will be indifferent with respect to which action β to apply. Nevertheless, we look
for a possibly different contract, which would provide Agent with strict incentives. We recover the following
result from [5] using our approach, and under a different set of technical conditions.
Proposition 6.6. Given constants κ and λ, consider the following ODE
U ′P (x− F (x))
U ′A(F (x))
= κF ′(x), (6.3)
and boundary condition F (0) = λ, with a solution (if exists) denoted F (x) = F (x;κ, λ). Consider the set S
of (κ, λ) such that a solution F exists, and if Agent is offered the contract CT = F (XT ), his value function
V (t, x) = V (t, x;κ, λ) solves the corresponding HJB equation, in which the supremum over β is attained at
the solution β⋆ to the first order conditions, and V is a C2,3 function on its domain, including at t = T .
With WT denoting a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance T , suppose there
exists m0 such that
E
[
UP
(
(U ′P )
−1
(
m0 exp{−
1
2
λ2T + λWT }
))]
,
is equal to Principal’s expected utility in the first best risk-sharing, for the given Agent’s expected utility R.
Assume also that there exists (κ0, λ0) ∈ S such that κ0 = m0/Vx(0, X0;κ0, λ0), and that Agent’s optimal
expected utility under the contract CT = F (XT ;κ0, λ0) is equal to his reservation utility R. Then, under
that contract, Agent will choose actions that will result in Principal attaining her corresponding first best
expected utility.
Note that the action process β chosen by Agent is not necessarily the same as the action process Principal
would dictate as the first best when paying Agent with cash. However, the expected utilities are the same
as the first best. We also mention that [5] present a number of examples for which the assumptions of the
proposition are satisfied, and in which, indeed, (6.3) provides the optimal contract.
Proof. Suppose the offered contract is of the form CT = F (XT ) for some function F for which Agent’s
value function V (t, x) satisfies Vxx < 0 and the corresponding HJB equation, given by
∂tV + sup
β
{
λβVx +
1
2
β2Vxx
}
= 0.
We get that Agent’s optimal action is β⋆ = −λ VxVxx and the HJB equation becomes
∂tV −
1
2
λ2
V 2x
Vxx
= 0, V (T, x) = UA(F (x)).
On the other hand, using Ito’s rule, we get
dVx =
(
∂tVx − λ
2Vx +
1
2
λ2
V 2x
V 2xx
Vxxx
)
dt− λVxdW.
Differentiating the HJB equation for V with respect to x, we see that the drift term is zero, and we have
dVx = −λVxdW, Vx(T, x) = U
′
A(F (x))F
′(x).
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The solution Vx(t,Xt) to the SDE is a martingale given by
Vx(t,Xt) = Vx(0, X0)Mt, where Mt := e
− 1
2
λ2t+λWt .
From the boundary condition we get
U ′A(F (XT ))F
′(XT ) = Vx(0, X0)MT .
On the other hand, it is known from [5] that the first best utility for Principal is attained if
U ′P (XT − CT ) = m0MT , (6.4)
where m0 is chosen so that Agent’s participation constraint is satisfied. If we choose F that satisfies the
ODE (6.3), with κ0 satisfying κ0 = m0/Vx(0.X0;κ0, λ0), then (6.4) is satisfied and we are done.
We now present a way to arrive at condition (6.4) using our approach. For a given (z, γ), Agent maximizes
λβz + 12γβ
2, thus the optimal β is, assuming γ < 0,
β⋆(z, γ) = −λ
z
γ
.
The HJB equation of Theorem 3.9 becomes then, with U = UP , and w = z/γ,∂tv + supz,w∈R2
{
−λ2wvx +
1
2
λ2w2
(
vxx + z
2vyy
)
+ λ2zw2vxy
}
= 0,
v(T, x, y) = UP (x− U
−1
A (y)).
First order conditions are
z⋆ = −
vxy
vyy
, w⋆ =
vx
vxx −
v2xy
vyy
.
The HJB equation becomes 
∂tv −
1
2
λ2
v2x
vxx −
v2xy
vyy
= 0,
v(T, x, y) = UP (x− U
−1
A (y)).
We also have, by Itoˆ’s rule,
dvx =
∂tvx − λ2 vxvxx
vxx −
v2xy
vyy
+
1
2
λ2
v2x(
vxx −
v2xy
v2yy
)2
[
vxxx +
v2xy
v2yy
vxyy − 2
vxy
vyy
vxxy
] dt− λvxdW,
vx(T, x, y) = U
′
P (x− U
−1
A (y)).
Differentiating the HJB equation for v with respect to x, we see that the drift term is zero, and we have
dvx = −λvxdW,
with the solution
vx(t,Xt, Yt) = m0e
− 1
2
λ2t+λWt .
From the boundary condition we get that the optimal contract payoff satisfies
U ′P (XT − CT ) = m0MT .
26
7 Conclusions
We consider a very general Principal-Agent problem, with a lump-sum payment at the end of the contracting
period. While we develop a simple to use approach, our proofs rely on deep results from the recent theory
of backward stochastic differential equations of the second order. The method consists of considering only
the contracts that allow a dynamic programming representation of the agent’s value function, for which it
is straightforward to identify the agent’s incentive compatible effort, and then showing that this leads to no
loss of generality. While our method encompasses most existing continuous-time Brownian motion models
with only the final lump-sum payment, it remains to be extended to the model with possibly continuous
payments. While that might involve technical difficulties, the road map we suggest is clear - identify the
generic dynamic programming representation of the agent’s value process, express the contract payments in
terms of the value process, and optimize the principal’s objective over such payments.
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